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COMMENTS
WISCONSIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO INTRASTATE TRAVEL, AND
ANTI-CRUISING ORDINANCES
Too many high school kids, it seems, are piling into their parents'
cars (or their own cars, in cases of extraordinary good fortune)
and driving up and down Main Street all evening, going nowhere.
Some of them, apparently, honk horns, lean out windows and
shout things.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The troubled constitutional right to intrastate travel received both a
blessing and a blow from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Lutz v.
City of York, Pa.2 Holding that there was a constitutionally protected
right to intrastate travel,3 the court nevertheless found York's anti-cruis-
ing ordinance an allowable restriction of that right.4 The Third Circuit
discarded the strict scrutiny test traditionally applied under the travel
doctrine and instead applied the newer intermediate scrutiny test.5 The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals took a page from the Third Circuit's book
in Scheunemann v. City of West Bend.6 Following the Third Circuit's rea-
soning, the Wisconsin court upheld West Bend's anti-cruising ordinance
as an appropriate time, place, and manner restriction on the right to in-
trastate travel.7 But the Third Circuit, and by derivation the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals, missed the point of a constitutional right to intrastate
travel in upholding the anti-cruising ordinances. This Comment will ex-
amine the basis for a constitutionally protected right to intrastate travel
and the different treatment that right has received from federal courts of
appeals. It will then examine the travel right as addressed by the courts
in Wisconsin and the issue of balancing the right to intrastate travel
1. Peter Egan, In Defense of Cruising, RoAD & TRAcK, Nov. 1993, at 29.
2. 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
3. Id at 268.
4. Id. at 270.
5. Id. at 269.
6. 179 Wis. 2d 469, 507 N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1993).
7. Id. at 480-81, 507 N.W.2d at 167.
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against the goals municipalities seek to achieve by enacting anti-cruising
ordinances.
II. INTRASTATE TRAVEL As A CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED RIGHT
The freedom to move about the nation has long been a recognized
right of every American, but the issue has become clouded when the
right to travel intrastate is separated from the right to travel interstate.
The right to travel interstate free from interference has long been recog-
nized by the United States Supreme Court.
A. The Travel Doctrine in the Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the right
to travel interstate in Crandall v. Nevada.8 The Court invalidated a Ne-
vada law that levied a tax upon every person who left the state by rail-
road or stagecoach. The Court held that, in levying the tax, Nevada
interfered with the federal government's right to call "any or all of its
citizens to aid in its service"9 and that the right to travel "cannot be
made to depend upon the pleasure of a state over whose territory they
must pass to reach the point where these services must be rendered."'"
But the more important result in Crandall was the Court's handling of an
individual right to travel free of restraint.
[I]f the government has these rights on her own account, the citi-
zen also has correlative rights. He has the right to come to the
seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that
government, or to transact any business he may have with it....
[A]nd this right is in its nature independent of the will of any
State over whose soil he must pass in exercise of it."
Although the right to travel through a state's territory without interfer-
ence by the state is explicitly recognized, the travel doctrine of 1868 ex-
tended only to travel that involved a transaction with the federal
government.
The Supreme Court expanded the travel doctrine in 1900 when it up-
held a Georgia law that levied a tax upon agents engaged in hiring citi-
zens of the state to be employed beyond the state's boundaries.' The
8. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
9. Id at 43.
10. Id
11. Id. at 44.
12. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
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Court approved the law because the tax act could "be said to affect the
freedom of egress from the State, or the freedom of contract... only
incidentally or remotely.' 1 3 The Supreme Court also provided the first
hint of the constitutional origin of a right to travel when it said:
Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from
one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of
personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or
through the territory of any State is a right secured by the Four-
teenth Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution.'4
The Court makes more than passing reference to the Fourteenth
Amendment'5 when citing the source for the right to travel, but the
broad reference to other provisions of the Constitution foreshadows
ninety years of varying constitutional attribution and resultant confusion
in the Supreme Court and among the circuits.' 6
The travel doctrine was revisited in United States v. Wheeler,'7 when
the Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal of an indictment against 25
defendants accused of abducting 221 citizens of Arizona that they con-
sidered undesirable. The victims were forcibly carried over the border
into New Mexico and threatened with death should they return to Ari-
zona. The defendants were charged with violating the victim's rights and
privileges to peacefully remain in a state, reside therein, and be immune
from unlawful deportation as secured by the Constitution of the United
States.' 8 The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, saying that the fed-
eral government did not have the power under the Constitution to pun-
ish such criminal acts.19
In all the States from the beginning down to the adoption of the
Articles of Confederation the citizens thereof possessed the fun-
13. Id. at 274.
14. Id.
15. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, § 1.
16. See infra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
17. 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
18. Id. at 292.
19. Id. at 293-95. While the Supreme Court does not specifically acknowledge that the
federal government lacked a criminal statute that covered the criminal activity, the lack of
such statute is the likely reason the government charged the defendants with violating the
victims' constitutional rights.
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damental fight, inherent in citizens of all free governments,
peacefully to dwell within the limits of their respective States, to
move at will from place to place therein, and to have free ingress
thereto and egress therefrom, with a consequent authority in the
States to forbid and punish violations of this fundamental right.20
The responsibility to mete out justice fell to the state of Arizona because
the federal government's ability to protect the privileges and immunities
of Arizona's citizens had been limited by the Slaughter-House Cases.2'
The constitutional sources for the fight to travel free from the interfer-
ence of government, but not from the interference of another person,
had by that time been attributed to the privileges and immunities guar-
anteed citizens of the United States by the Constitution.2
The Supreme Court took the travel doctrine three steps forward in
Kent v. Dulles23 and Aptheker v. Secretary of State.24 In Kent the Court
held that the Constitution may prohibit the federal govermaent from re-
stricting an individual's right to travel. At issue was an attempt by the
federal government to deny passports to communists and prevent them
from traveling outside the United States to conduct their controversial
business. The Court held the particular travel restrictions invalid saying
that "[t]he right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amend-
ment."25 Six years later in Aptheker, the Court struck down a ban by the
federal government on the use of passports by communists.26 The Court
found the freedom to travel without hindrance by the government a lib-
erty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and "a constitutional liberty
closely related to rights of free speech and association."'27 One year later
the Court moved the travel doctrine two steps back when it approved a
government ban on travel to Cuba.' The Supreme Court balanced the
interest of the government against the interest of individuals. The gov-
ernment won. This marked the first explicit use of what came to be
20. Id. at 293.
21. Id. at 293-94, citing the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The
Slaughter-House Cases made it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immuni-
ties clause only protects those rights "which owe their existence to the Federal government, its
National character, its Constitution, or its laws." Id. at 79.
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
23. 357 U.S. 116 (1958), overruled by Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, reh'g denied, 469 U.S.
912 (1984).
24. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
25. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 125.
26. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 505.
27. Id. at 517.
28. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965).
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known as the rational relationship test for constitutionality under the
travel doctrine.
The Supreme Court returned to the domestic right to travel in 1966
with United States v. Guest.29 Guest marked the first modem considera-
tion of whether the Constitution secured the right to travel free from
private interference. The case stemmed from the indictment of six
whites for using terror and murder to deprive blacks as well as white civil
rights workers of their rights.30 Federal prosecutors charged the defend-
ants with criminal conspiracy to violate the victims' civil rights3' and
sought to include the right to travel among the rights infringed upon.
The district court dismissed the indictment on the grounds that it did not
charge an offense under the laws of the United States. The Supreme
Court agreed with the prosecution and held that "[t]he constitutional
right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the high-
ways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, oc-
cupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is
a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized." 32
The Court continued:
Although the Articles of Confederation provided that "the peo-
ple of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from
any other State," that right finds no explicit mention in the Con-
stitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so ele-
mentary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In
any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has
long been recognized as a basic right under the constitution.33
The Court canvassed possible sources for the constitutional right to in-
terstate travel, but did not pin the right on any particular sleeve. "All
have agreed that the right exists. Its explicit recognition as one of the
29. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
30. Id. at 747.
31. The defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 241, which provides in perti-
nent part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person
in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; ....
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964), cited in Guest, 383 U.S. at 747.
32. Guest, 383 U.S. at 757.
33. Id. at 758 (footnotes omitted).
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federal rights protected by what is now 18 U.S.C. § 241 goes back at least
as far as 1904."34
In Shapiro v. Thompson35 the Supreme Court invoked the right to
travel interstate to invalidate an indirect burden on travel for the first
time.36 Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia had all
enacted statutory provisions which denied welfare assistance to people
who had not resided within the jurisdiction for at least one year prior to
applying for public assistance. The statutes were held unconstitutional at
the district court level and reached the Supreme Court on appeal.37 The
Court said that "in moving from State to State or to the District of Co-
lumbia appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classifi-
cation which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to
be necessary to promote a compelling government interest, is unconstitu-
tional. '38 With this language the Supreme Court elevated the test for
interference with the constitutional right to interstate travel to the level
of strict scrutiny. 9 Shapiro is notable for its invalidation of an indirect
burden on the right to travel interstate and the first mention of the strict
scrutiny test for impingements on that right. The following years saw
several cases build on the foundation laid in Shapiro.
The next case to raise the right to interstate travel was Dunn v. Blum-
stein.40 The Court struck down Tennessee's one-year residency require-
ment for voting in state elections.41 Applying the compelling state
interest standard over Tennessee's objection,42 the Supreme Court said
34. Id. at 759.
35. 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, reh'g denied, 416
U.S. 1000 (1974). The Supreme Court in Edelman disapproved of the Eleventh Amendment
holdings in Shapiro, Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Org., 409 U.S. 809 (1972), State
Dep't. of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972), and Gaddis v. Wyman,
304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970)(per
curiam). In each of these cases, state directors of public aid had been ordered to make retro-
active payments by the district court. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed without consid-
eration of Eleventh Amendment objections by the state officers. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 670.
The Court changed its mind on the Eleventh Amendment issue and overruled its prior deci-
sions. Id. at 671. The Supreme Court, the circuit courts of appeals, and the U.S. district courts
continue to cite to Shapiro for support of the right to travel interstate.
36. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631.
37. Id. at 621-22.
38. Id. at 634.
39. The Supreme Court does not provide a rationale for the imposition of the strict scru-
tiny standard in Shapiro. See Andrew C. Porter, Comment, Toward a Constitutional Analysis
of the Right to Intrastate Travel, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 820, 826-27 (1992).
40. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
41. Id. at 333.
42. Id. at 339.
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that "durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal pro-
tection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate
that such laws are 'necessary to promote a compelling governmental in-
terest.' "I4 The laws "must be 'tailored' to serve their legitimate objec-
tives. And if there are other reasonable ways to achieve those goals with
a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not
choose the way of greater interference. If a State acts at all, it must
choose the 'less drastic means.' "44 The Supreme Court had now placed
the right to interstate travel within the boundaries of the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,45 again
changing the attribute of the Constitution that protected the right to
travel interstate.
The Supreme Court furthered the analysis of the constitutional right
to travel when it decided Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.46 The
Court considered an Arizona statute that required indigents to reside
within a county in Arizona for one year before receiving medical care at
that particular county's expense.47 Overruling the Arizona Supreme
Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the law intruded on the right to
interstate travel because it "created two classes of needy residents 'indis-
tinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents
who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have
resided less than a year in the jurisdiction.' "I "[T]he right of interstate
travel must be seen as insuring new residents the same right to vital gov-
ernment benefits and privileges in the States to which they migrate as
are enjoyed by other residents." 49 The Supreme Court finally mentioned
intrastate travel in Maricopa County. The Court announced that "[e]ven
were we to draw a constitutional distinction between interstate and in-
trastate travel, [it is] a question we do not now consider."50 Having so
spoken on intrastate travel, the Supreme Court abandoned the issue,
never to return.
The Supreme Court recently revisited the travel doctrine in Attorney
Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez." The New York Constitution and
43. Id. at 342 (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 343 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
46. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
47. Id. at 251.
48. Id. at 254 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969), overruled by
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974)).
49. Maricopa, 415 U.S. at 261.
50. Id. at 255-56.
51. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
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Civil Service Law granted a civil service employment preference to New
York residents who were honorably discharged veterans of the armed
forces and were residents of the state when they entered military service.
Soto-Lopez qualified for the preference with one exception: He had not
been a resident of the state of New York when he entered military ser-
vice. Soto-Lopez alleged that the preference violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth -Amendment and the constitutionally
protected right to travel.52 The Supreme Court, in affirming the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion voiding the preference, said that "[a]
state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel,
when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses 'any classi-
fication which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.' "53 The
Court noted that "'freedom to travel throughout the United States has
long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution' 5 4 ... [a]nd,
it is clear that the freedom to travel includes the 'freedom to enter and
abide in any State in the Union.' ,5 The holding in Soto-Lopez indi-
cates that the travel doctrine is still governed by the law established in
Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County.
The Supreme Court has firmly established interstate travel as a pro-
tected right that can be found in numerous constitutional provisions,56
but the Court has mentioned intrastate travel only in passing. It has held
that interference with intrastate travel is prohibited when there is some
aspect of interstate commerce, interstate travel, or some power of the
federal government involved, but the Court has left the issue of state
interference with intrastate travel to the lower federal courts.
B. The Circuit Courts of Appeals Split
Presented with only the guidance from Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County,57 the Circuit Courts of Appeal were free to go their divergent
ways on the issue of a constitutional right to intrastate travel. The cir-
cuits are divided into three camps: those that have not recognized a con-
52. Id. at 900-01.
53. Id. at 903 (citations omitted) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969),
overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974)). The use of
Shapiro by the Supreme Court in this context indicates that the portions of Shapiro relating to
the right to travel are still valid precedent.
54. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S at 901 (quoting U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)).
55. Id. at 902 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285 (1970)).
56. See infra notes 110-26 and accompanying text.
57. 415 U.S. at 255-56.
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stitutional right to intrastate travel, those that have, and those that have
not directly addressed the issue.
1. The Circuits That Have Refused to Recognize Constitutional
Protection
Three circuit courts of appeals have weighed in against a constitu-
tional right to intrastate travel: the Fifth Circuit in Wright v. City of
Jackson 58 the Sixth Circuit in Wardwell v. Board of Educ.,59 and the
Fourth Circuit in Eldridge v. Bouchard.6" There is more to this opposi-
tion than meets the eye, however. The decisions in both Wright and
Wardwell are based on the outcome of Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v.
City of Detroit.61 In Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, the Michigan Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of a Detroit ordinance that re-
quired city police officers to live within the city limits. The Detroit Po-
lice Officers Association argued that the ordinance violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 1 of the Michigan Constitution.62 The court
held that the Detroit ordinance was not a violation of either the equal
protection clause or the Michigan Constitution.
These constitutional provisions (the Federal and State equal pro-
tection clauses) do not mean that there can be no classification in
the application of statutes and ordinances, but only that the classi-
fication must be based on natural distinguishing characteristics
and must bear a reasonable relation to the object of the
legislation.63
The United States Supreme Court dismissed the Detroit Police Officers
Association's appeal for want of a substantial federal question.64
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals drew on Detroit Police Officers
Ass'n in Wright v. City of Jackson,65 where it addressed a city ordinance
requiring municipal employees to live within the city limits. "Any doubt
that the 'right to travel' rationale of Shapiro and Dunn was meant to
apply to intrastate travel and municipal employment residency require-
58. 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
59. 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
60. 645 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd without opinion, 823 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1987).
61. 190 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. 1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972)(dismissing the ap-
peal for want of substantial federal question).
62. Id. at 102.
63. Id. at 103 (quoting Cook Coffee Co. v. Village of Flushing, 255 N.W. 177, 178 (Mich.
1934)).
64. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
65. 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
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ments was put to rest by the Supreme Court's treatment of litigation
challenging a Detroit ordinance similar to the Jackson residency require-
ment. ' 66 The court based its finding on the fact that "dismissal for want
of a substantial federal question in a state court appeal is fully equivalent
to affirmance on the merits in an appeal from a federal court insofar as
the federal questions ... are concerned. '67
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals followed much the same reason-
ing in Wardwell v. Board of Educ.68 when it addressed a challenge to a
City of Cincinnati Board of Education requirement that teachers live
within the city's school district within 90 days of employment. 69 While it
did not base its decision primarily on Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, the
court "recognize[d] that the Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal 'for
want of a substantial federal question' is a decision on the merits of the
case appealed. ' 70 The court did address the issue of a right to intrastate
travel.
We find no support for plaintiff's theory that the right to intra-
state travel has been afforded federal constitutional protection.
An examination of Shapiro, Dunn, and the Supreme Court's
more recent opinion in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,
convinces us that the aspect of the right to travel with which the
Court was concerned in those cases is not involved here.7'
The final installment in the list of those refusing to recognize constitu-
tional protection for intrastate travel is the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth
Circuit affirmed without opinion a district court decision in Eldridge v.
Bouchard.72 The district court quashed an attack on the State of Vir-
ginia's practice of paying state police officers higher wages in certain pa-
trol districts. Virginia paid the differentials to offset higher living costs in
the patrol districts and thereby retain veteran State Police personnel.7'
The plaintiffs argued that the pay differential violated their right to equal
protection of the laws and their right to travel. The district court re-
jected the equal protection argument and went on to address the right to
travel claim. "This type of explicit restriction on travel is the type of
situation to which the language in Soto-Lopez refers when it states that
'[a] state law implicates on the right to travel when it actually deters such
66. Id. at 902.
67. Id. at 903 (quoting Ahem v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1972)).
68. 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
69. Id. at 626.
70. Id. at 628 (quoting Ahern, 457 F.2d at 364).
71. Id. at 627 (citations omitted).
72. 645 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd without opinion, 823 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1987).
73. Id. at 750-51.
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right.' "74 The court also addressed the issue of a right to intrastate
travel.
After a careful review of the record, this court is unable to con-
ceive how the differential impinges intrastate travel. It appears
that the same facts that failed to support a finding of a violation
of the right to interstate travel also fail to support a finding of a
violation of the right of intrastate travel. The court, however,
need not reach this issue because the plaintiffs do not have a fed-
erally recognized fundamental right of intrastate travel. Having a
fundamental right of interstate travel does not necessitate recog-
nizing a fundamental right of intrastate travel. In fact, it is en-
tirely consistent to recognize the right to interstate travel without
recognizing the right of intrastate travel.75
The district court was careful, however, to cover all of its bases. It fur-
ther elaborated that "even if the plaintiffs had a fundamental right of
intrastate travel, the present salary differential would not impinge that
right."
7 6
The nonexistence of a constitutional right to travel intrastate free
from interference is largely based on what the Supreme Court has not
said, as opposed to any positive statement from the Court on the law and
the Constitution. Given this void, several circuits have gone the other
way.
2. The Circuits That Recognize Constitutional Protection
The first to jump in the other direction was the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals. In King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth.,77 the court re-
viewed a New York Public Housing Law that admitted to securing public
housing in the City of New Rochelle only for those who had been resi-
dents of the city for five continuous years. The court declared that "[i]t
would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a
fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a cor-
relative constitutional right to travel within a state."78 Because a funda-
mental personal right was involved (the right to travel intrastate), the
classification created by the New York Public Housing Law "can be up-
74. Id. at 752-53 (quoting Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986)).
75. Id. at 753-54.
76. Id. at 754.
77. 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cerit denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
78. Id. at 648.
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held only if it furthers a compelling state interest."79 The court found
that no compelling state interest was involved.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals entered the fray two years later
in Wellford v. Battaglia80 when it approved a district court decision strik-
ing down a City of Wilmington, Delaware, statute that required candi-
dates for mayor to have resided in the city for five years.81 The district
court held that the residence requirement penalized the free migration
into and out of the city. "The right to travel referred to by the court in
the Dunn case is a right to intrastate as well as interstate migration."'
Four years later the right to travel issue was back in Bykofsky v. Bor-
ough of Middletown, a district court decision which the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals approved without opinion.83 In Bykofsky the district
court upheld the Borough of Middletown's juvenile curfew ordinance.
While admitting that "[o]ne may be on the streets even though he is
there merely for exercise, recreation, walking, standing, talking, social-
izing, or any other purpose that does not interfere with other persons'
rights,"'8 the court held that "the governmental interests furthered by
the curfew ordinance override[ ] the minor's constitutional right to intra-
state travel."8 5 This seems to be a departure from the absolute standard
announced in Wellford, but the difference is attributable to the degree to
which the constitutional rights of minors are treated differently than
those of adults.86 Once this difference is considered, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals has treated the constitutional right to intrastate travel
consistently. Fourteen years later, the court would have an opportunity
to speak on the issue again.
79. Id.
80. 485 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
81. Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143, 150 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d
1151 (3d Cir. 1973).
82. Id. at 147 (citing King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971)).
83. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd without
opinion, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
84. Id. at 1254.
85. Id. at 1261.
86. There has been considerable controversy over the nature of a minor's constitutional
rights and the degree to which these rights are protected. The right to challenge invalid gov-
ernment intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights is not one which may only be as-
serted upon the attainment of any particular age. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52,74 (1976). "Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess consti-
tutional rights." Id. The Supreme Court has held, however that "the power of the state to
control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults." Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944).
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The City of York, Pennsylvania, had a problem. "[O]n certain days
and [at certain] times, a threat to the public health, safety and welfare
[arose] from the congestion created by repetitive unnecessary driving of
motor vehicles on main thoroughfares within the City of York."'  York
reacted by passing a municipal ordinance that prohibited "cruising" in
the affected areas. ss The affected miscreants sought injunctive and de-
clarative relief, claiming that the ordinance violated their right to travel
and was overbroad. The district court applied the rational relationship
test89 and found that the ordinance was reasonably related to the city's
legitimate traffic safety objectives." An appeal followed and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals decided the issue in Lutz v. City of York, Pa.91
The court held that there was a constitutionally protected right to intra-
state travel and concluded that "the right to move freely about one's
neighborhood or town, even by automobile, is indeed 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' and 'deeply rooted in the Nation's his-
tory.' "I The court then attributed the right to travel to the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause.93 The Third Circuit departed from the
district court's assessment of constitutional infringement, however, and
selected the (relatively) new intermediate scrutiny test,94 finding that
York's anti-cruising ordinance, because it was narrowly tailored to a sig-
nificant government interest, did not violate the right to intrastate
travel.95 Although it subordinated the right to intrastate travel to a sig-
nificant government interest, the Third Circuit took the lead in establish-
ing intrastate travel as a protected constitutional right.
87. Yor, PA., ORDINANcE No. 6, § 2 (1988), reprinted in Lutz v. City of York, Pa., 899
F.2d 255, 257 (3d Cir. 1990).
88. "Cruising" or "unnecessary repetitive driving" is defined as:
[D]riving a motor vehicle on a street past a traffic control point, as designated by the
York City Police Department, more than twice in any two (2) hour period, between the
hours of 7:00 p.m. and 3:30 a.m. The passing of a designated control point a third time
under the aforesaid conditions shall constitute unnecessary repetitive driving and
therefore a violation of this Ordinance.
Ild.
89. See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
90. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 258.
91. 899 F.2d 255.
92. Id. at 268 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) and Moore v. City
of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
93. Id. at 267.
94. Id. at 269.
95. Id. at 270.
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3. Those Circuits That Are Still in Limbo
The remaining circuit courts of appeals have not come down on one
side or the other. It has been suggested that the Seventh Circuit may be
leaning against intrastate travel as a protected constitutional right,96 but
a survey of its decisions reveals that the court has not jumped off the
fence. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was first presented with
the opportunity to address the issue in Ahern v. Murphy.97 Ahern dealt
with a Chicago ordinance that required city police officers to reside
within the corporate boundaries of the city. The district court dismissed
an action to overturn the ordinance. Three days before oral arguments
on the appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed Detroit Police Officers Ass'n
v. City of Detroit98 for want of a substantial federal question.9 The Sev-
enth Circuit cited Detroit Police Officers Ass'n as authority to affirm the
district court's dismissal, saying that the "Supreme Court has labeled as
unsubstantial the very question which constitutes the plaintiffs' most
likely basis for asserting federal question jurisdiction."'1
The issue of residency requirements came before the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals again in Andre v. Board of Trustees. 10' The plaintiffs
challenged a requirement that municipal employees of the Village of
Maywood, Illinois, live within the village's corporate boundaries, citing
violations of due process, equal protection, and the constitutional right
to travel. °2 The court rejected the employees' claims, but in so doing
spoke to the issue of intrastate travel. Like the Supreme Court in Me-
morial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,03 the Seventh Circuit said that "[t]he
right to travel interstate, although nowhere expressed in the Constitu-
tion, has long been recognized as a basic fundamental right,"' ° but that
"in this case, we need not consider whether a right of intrastate travel
should be acknowledged." 05 Presented with an opportunity to break
96. For support of the idea that the Seventh Circuit might not favor a constitutional right
to intrastate travel, see Eldridge v. Bouchard, 645 F. Supp. 749, 754 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd
without opinion, 823 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Andre v. Board of Trustees, 561 F.2d 48
(7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); see also Porter, supra note 39, at 835-36.
97. 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972).
98. 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
99. Id.
100. Ahem, 457 F.2d at 365 (quoting Port Auth. Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of
New York Auth., 387 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1967)).
101. 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
102. Id. at 49.
103. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
104. Andre, 561 F.2d at 52.
105. Id. at 53.
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new constitutional ground, the Seventh Circuit chose discretion over
valour and left its shovel at home.
The court took a small step toward the recognition of a constitutional
right to intrastate travel with Swank v. Smart.' In Swank, a police of-
ficer was discharged, in part, for giving a seventeen-year-old female col-
lege student a ride on his motorcycle. He brought a civil action against
the firing city, police department, and chief of police. The district court
dismissed the case and the officer appealed. 0 7 The Seventh Circuit re-
manded for procedural violations in the officer's termination hearing,
but addressed the issue of the freedom of speech and travel.
A law that enjoined silence on all persons not participating in the
marketplace of ideas, a law that forbade people to go from one
place to another within the same state (and so extinguished the
"right of locomotion," as distinct from the right to travel inter-
state), a law that forbade dating or, for that matter, forbade an
off-duty policeman to offer a ride on his motorcycle to a coed-
all of these hypothetical laws would infringe liberty. If arbitrary,
they would be deemed to violate "substantive due process," the
term for the protection that the due process clause has been held
to extend to substantive rights not listed in the Bill of Rights. 08
The Seventh Circuit, while not endorsing a right to intrastate travel with
Swank, has at least indicated that it would favorably receive a request
for such an endorsement.
C. The Constitutional Origin of the Right to Travel
The Supreme Court has cited numerous provisions of the Constitu-
tion and its amendments as possible sources for the right to travel.
Those potential sources include the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause, 09 the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities
Clause,110 rights of national citizenship,"' the Commerce Clause,".2
106. 898 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1990).
107. Id. at 1249-50.
108. Id. at 1251 (citation omitted).
109. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV was the first recorded source of
the right to travel. See Porter, supra note 39, at 848-49.
110. The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause has supplanted the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. See U.S. v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294-95
(1920). The viability of this doctrine is also limited by the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873). See supra note 21.
111. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1868).
112. See U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
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Equal Protection,113 and Substantive Due Process. 14 The modem travel
doctrine has placed the right to travel in either the Equal Protection or
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.?' 5
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals provided a detailed analysis of
the potential sources for the right to intrastate travel in Lutz v. City of
York." 6 The court first discarded any argument based on the Privileges
and Immunities Clauses of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court concluded that following the limitations imposed by the
Slaughter-House Cases, the clauses provide no protection from an ordi-
nance enacted by a local government and enforced on local citizens." 7
The Third Circuit then addressed the rights of national citizenship and
concluded that "Lutz can proceed unimpeded by law (once he makes his
way through the traffic jams on Philadelphia and Market Streets) to any
federal installation at which he is called upon to exercise the various
rights and duties of citizenship."" 8 The Commerce Clause was held in-
applicable because "York's ordinance is facially neutral as to interstate
commerce, and imposes no threat of burdening the stream of commerce
with conflicting regulation.""' 9 The Third Circuit contended that the use
of the equal protection clause in Shapiro v. Thompson and its progeny is
the result of a group being singled out and punished for exercising their
constitutionally protected right to travel, and not as the source of that
right.12
0
The other possibilities rejected, the Third Circuit concluded that the
source of the right to travel is substantively protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. 121 The court cited the Supreme Court
113. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring), over-
ruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253-56
(1974); Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903-04 (1986).
114. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270,274 (1900) (Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) overruled by Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222,
reh'g denied, 469 U.S. 912 (1984) (Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964) (Fifth Amendment due process clause).
115. See supra notes 113-114.
116. 899 F.2d 255, 262-68 (3d Cir. 1990).
117. Id. at 262-64; see supra note 21.
118. Id. at 265; see supra note 111 and accompanying text.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 266.
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decisions in Williams v. Fears,"2 Kent v. Dulles," and Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State'24 in support of its conclusion.
We conclude that the right to move freely about one's neighbor-
hood or town, even by automobile, is indeed "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted in the Nation's
history." Despite our preceding analysis, this bottom-line judg-
ment is unquestionably ad hoc, to some extent. However, unless
the Supreme Court either repudiates substantive due process al-
together (an unlikely prospect), decides the question left open in
Maricopa County, or limits substantive due process analysis to
more specific fact patterns - in other words, limits substantive due
process rights to "a series of isolated points" ... it is a judgment
we are required to make.125
Having resolutely placed the constitutional right to intrastate travel
within the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the court went
on to discuss the standard of review that was appropriate for the new
right.
D. Selecting a Standard for Review
The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to impingements of the
right to interstate travel in Shapiro v. Thompson,'126 Dunn v. Blum-
stein,127 Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,' 8 and Attorney Gen. of
122. 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another
according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of
free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured by the Four-
teenth Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution.
Id. at 274.
123. 357 U.S. 116 (1958) overruled by Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, reh'g denied, 469 U.S.
912 (1984). "The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be de-
prived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 125.
124. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). The Court found the freedom to travel without hindrance by
the government a liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and "a constitutional liberty
closely related to rights of free speech and association." Id. at 517.
125. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1990).
126. 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, reh'g denied, 416
U.S. 1000 (1974). "[A]ny classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right,
unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitu-
tional." Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.
127. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Restrictions "are unconstitutional unless the State can demon-
strate that such laws are 'necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.'" Id. at
342 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)(first emphasis added)). The re-
strictions "must be 'tailored' to serve their legitimate objectives. And if there are other, rea-
sonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity,
a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose the 'less
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New York v. Soto-Lopez.'29 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ex-
amined York's anti-cruising ordinance under the rubric of strict scrutiny
and concluded that were it "to employ least restrictive analysis, as re-
quired by the traditional strict scrutiny test, we agree with the plaintiffs
that the ordinance could not survive. ' 130 The court then moved down
the scrutiny ladder to the intermediate scrutiny level.13  To survive the
intermediate scrutiny test, a law must be fashioned or "tailored to serve
significant government interests - not necessarily compelling ones - while
leaving open ample alterative channels of communication.'1 32 "More-
over, the tailoring requirement in this context does not require the state
to employ the least restrictive means of achieving its end, as it would
under full-blown strict scrutiny.' 33 The Third Circuit continued the
comparison to restrictions on public speech.
[T]he right to travel cannot conceivably imply the right to travel
whenever, wherever and however one pleases - even on roads
specifically designed for public travel. Unlimited access to public
fora or roadways would result not in maximizing individuals' op-
portunity to engage in protected activity, but chaos. To prevent
that, state and local governments must enjoy some degree of flex-
ibility to regulate access to, and use of, the publicly held instru-
mentalities of speech and travel.134
Following this reasoning, the Third Circuit upheld York's anti-cruising
ordinance as an appropriate time, place, and manner restriction on the
right to intrastate travel. 35
The Third Circuit did not consider the rational relationship test in
deciding the appropriate level of scrutiny for the right to travel intra-
state. The rational relationship test has not been used since Zemel v.
Rusk, and has been surpassed by Shapiro and its progeny.
drastic means.'" Id. at 343 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631, and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960).
128. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). "Such a classification can only be sustained on a showing of a
compelling state interest." Id. at 269.
129. 476 U.S. 898 (1986). "All four justifications [for the statute] fail to withstand height-
ened scrutiny on a common ground .... " Id. at 909.
130. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1990).
131. The intermediate scrutiny test was developed under the doctrine of Equal Protection
and was first applied by the Supreme Court in gender discrimination cases. See LAWRENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-26, at 1561 (2d ed. 1988). The intermediate
scrutiny test has also found some use in First Amendment cases. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269.
132. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269. The court is describing the intermediate scrutiny test in the
First Amendment context.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 270.
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H. ThE TREATMENT OF THm RIGHT TO TRAVEL IN WISCONSIN
While the freedom to travel has long been afforded protection at the
federal level, the development of a state level travel doctrine has been a
much more recent phenomenon. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the issue, but not to the depth that the federal courts have. Nev-
ertheless, the right to travel enjoys recognition and protection in the
State of Wisconsin.
A. Travel as a Protected Right in Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed the freedom of movement
issue directly in Ervin v. State.136 The defendant had been arrested on a
Milwaukee street in August 1967 for violation of a curfew declared by
the mayor of Milwaukee under emergency powers granted by the state.
The defendant challenged his arrest on the grounds that the curfew was a
violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment fights. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that the "municipal cur-
few as was [sic] imposed in Milwaukee [was] an emergency measure un-
dertaken to restore order in the community" and therefore did not
infringe upon the freedom to travel.'3 7 The court described the nature
of the freedom to travel:
The freedom to move about is a basic right of citizens under our
form of government, in fact, under any system of ordered liberty
worth the name. It was not added to our United States Constitu-
tion by the enactment of the first ten amendments. It is inherent,
not only in the Bill of Rights, but in the original document itself.
It has properly been termed "engrained in our history" and "a
part of our heritage.' ' 38
The court next examined the issue in Vanden Broek v. Reitz.139 In
Vanden Broek the court addressed a dispute between the appellants and
the municipality that was responsible for their public relief payments.
The appellants wished to remain in a second municipality and have the
first continue to be responsible for their relief payments. The first mu-
nicipality wanted the appellants to move back and seek gainful employ-
ment.140 The appellants' demurrer was rejected by the circuit court and
they appealed, alleging that the forced move would violate their right to
travel. The appellants also argued that the court had implicitly recog-
136. 41 Wis. 2d 194, 163 N.W.2d 207 (1968).
137. Id. at 201, 163 N.W.2d at 210-211.
138. Id. at 200-01, 163 N.W.2d at 210 (footnote omitted).
139. 53 Wis. 2d 87, 191 N.W.2d 913 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S. 902 (1972).
140. Id. at 89-90, 191 N.W.2d at 914-15.
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nized the intrastate nature of the right to travel in Ervin v. State.14 1 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court differed and held that the issue in Ervin was
not at all relevant to the issue in Vanden Broek. The court discussed the
travel doctrine as established by the United States Supreme Court in
Shapiro v. Thompson and the recent decision recognizing the right to
intrastate travel by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in King v. New
Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth.,1n2 but concluded: "Assuming, without decid-
ing, that the right to travel envisions intrastate as well as interstate
movement, in this case we find no showing that the defendants' right to
travel is impaired."'14 3
The Wisconsin Supreme Court most recently spoke to the issue of the
right to travel in Milwaukee v. K.F 4 K.F., who was 15 years old at the
time, was issued a citation for violating Milwaukee's curfew ordinance as
it pertains to minors. The ordinance prohibits minors from being at
large in the city without adult supervision between 11 P.M. and 5
A.M. 4 5 K.F. challenged the ordinance claiming that it violated the fun-
damental right to freedom of movement and travel, among other consti-
tutional rights."46 The court reiterated its position on the freedom to
travel and then broadened the right to intrastate travel by saying: "This
right to be free to move about within one's own state is inherent and
distinct from the right to interstate travel protected by the commerce
clause."'147 Having broadened the right to travel in Wisconsin, the court
rejected K.F.'s claim that the right to travel was restricted by the curfew.
The court attributed this contradiction to K.F.'s status as a juvenile, not-
ing that "it has become a well-recognized precept of constitutional law
that a statute or ordinance which might be unconstitutional as applied to
an adult might be constitutional as applied with respect to juveniles."' ' 8
The inherent right to move about within one's own state was then left to
the lower courts to apply.
B. But Travel Is Not a Protected Right in West Bend Wisconsin
The City of West Bend, Wisconsin, it seems, also had a problem.
Some young people were apparently cruising on Main Street and local
141. Id. at 97, 191 N.W.2d at 919.
142. Id. at 96-99, 191 N.W.2d at 918-919.
143. Id. at 98, 191 N.W.2d at 919.
144. 145 Wis. 2d 24, 426 N.W.2d 329 (1988).
145. Id. at 31, 426 N.W.2d at 332.
146. Id. at 41, 426 N.W.2d at 336-37.
147. Id. at 42, 426 N.W.2d at 337.
148. Id. at 44, 426 N.W.2d at 338; see supra note 86.
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authorities believed that they were creating a public nuisance and a
threat to the public health and safety. 49 The West Bend Common
Council acted by passing an ordinance that prohibited repetitive, unnec-
essary driving, also known as "cruising."' 50 The Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals heard the challenge to the anti-cruising ordinance in Scheunemann
v. City of West Bend'5 ' on appeal from the circuit court. The appellants
challenged the anti-cruising ordinance on various constitutional grounds.
The Court of Appeals condensed the challenges into one based on the
right to travel,152 and debated the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply
when analyzing the ordinance. Its choices were strict scrutiny as applied
in Shapiro v. Thompson and the intermediate scrutiny applied in Lutz v.
City of York.'5 3 The court said that it, "like the circuit court, agree[s]
with the logic of the Lutz court on this question. We therefore will sub-
ject West Bend's cruising ordinance to intermediate scrutiny, and we will
uphold it if it is narrowly tailored to meet the city's objectives."'154 The
Scheunemann court explained:
149. Scheunemann v. City of West Bend, 179 Wis. 2d 469,473-74,507 N.W.2d 163, 164-65
(Ct. App. 1993).
150. WEsr BEND, Wi, ORnNmANCES § 7.131 (1992). The ordinance states in pertinent
part:
"Cruising" means driving a motor vehicle in the same direction past a traffic control
point on a street in the designated area three (3) or more times within a two (2) hour
period between the hours of 8:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M. in a manner and under circum-
stances manifesting a "purpose" of unnecessary, repetitive driving in such area.
Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such pur-
pose is manifested are that such person or any other person present in the vehicle
attempts to gain the attention of other motorists or pedestrians or engages them in
conversation, whether by hailing, arm waving, horn blowing, or another action or de-
vice; that such person or any other person present in the vehicle enters or exits the
vehicle directly from or to another vehicle driven in or parked in close proximity to the
designated area; that such person or any other person present in the vehicle violates
state or municipal traffic regulations or municipal ordinances; or that such person has
declared his or her purpose for driving to be that of cruising. The violator's conduct
must be such as to demonstrate a specific intent to cruise. No arrest shall be made for a
violation of this section unless the arresting officer first affords an opportunity to ex-
plain such conduct; and no person shall be convicted of violating this section if it ap-
pears at trial that the explanation given was true and disclosed a lawful purpose, not
unnecessary, repetitive driving. Lawful purposes include traveling to a specific destina-
tion by a person whose residence address is in the designated area or by a person
whose business or employment requires driving in the designated area, and operating
an official emergency or police vehicle in the designated area.
Id., reprinted in Scheunemann, 179 Wis. 2d at 474-75, 507 N.W.2d at 165.
151. 179 Wis. 2d 469, 507 N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1993).
152. Id. at 478, 507 N.W.2d at 166.
153. Id. at 479, 507 N.W.2d at 167.
154. Id. at 480, 507 N.W.2d at 167.
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Under the intermediate scrutiny test, we inquire whether the or-
dinance imposes "content-neutral time, place and manner restric-
tions that are narrowly tailored to serve significant government
interests - not necessarily compelling ones - while leaving open
ample alternative channels [by which the citizen may exercise the
right at issue]." Under the intermediate scrutiny approach, the
tailoring requirement does not require that the ordinance employ
the least restrictive means of achieving its end, as it would under a
full-blown strict scrutiny approach.155
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that West Bend's anti-cruising or-
dinance was an appropriate time, place, and manner restriction on the
right to intrastate travel. 156
IV. CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in reaching its decision in
Scheunemann, briefly mentioned Ervin v. State while discussing the right
to travel. 57 The court did not examine Milwaukee v. KF.158 That omis-
sion was a critical lapse. K.F. contains the strongest language from the
Wisconsin Supreme Court on the issue of the right to intrastate travel. 59
It is possible that the comments from the Wisconsin Supreme Court
would have changed the outcome in Scheunemann. Even if the result
remained unchanged, a more precise interpretation of the language from
K.F would have been valuable. K.F. may suggest a move to the strict
scrutiny standard of review, which would have rendered West Bend's
anti-cruising ordinance void. Until the wording in K. is clarified, the
appropriate test for restrictions of travel in Wisconsin remains in doubt.
The number of municipal restrictions on travel continues to increase
as municipalities seek to wrest control of their streets away from the
elements they deem undesirable. Determining the appropriate test and
level of scrutiny is a critical step in reviewing laws and insuring that they
do not unduly infringe on the constitutional rights of Wisconsin's
citizens.
GREGORY J. MODE
155. Id. at 479,507 N.W.2d at 167 (quoting Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255,269 (3d Cir.
1990)).
156. Id at 480-81, 507 N.W.2d at 167.
157. Id at 478, 507 N.W.2d at 166.
158. 145 Wis. 2d 24, 426 N.W.2d 329 (1988).
159. Id. at 42, 426 N.W.2d at 337. "This right to be free to move about within one's own
state is inherent and distinct from the right to interstate travel protected by the commerce
clause." Id.
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